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ABSTRACT
Drug use is a global problem that impacts every country around the world. Although this issue is
international in nature, there is no one shared response to addiction globally. The approach
utilized by each country can generally be characterized as punitive or rehabilitative.
Rehabilitative approaches, which center around the employment of harm reduction services,
focus on reducing the negative consequences of drug use, while punitive approaches respond to
substance use with prison sentences. Considering this lack of commonality in response, I sought
to better understand potential causes for this disparity and was especially curious if government
structure impacts the policy in place. My research examines the relationship between addiction
policy and democracy characteristics 39 industrialized democracies. The democracy
characteristics, categorized as either majoritarian or consensus, are founded upon Dr. Arend
Lijphart’s theoretical framework. To execute this research, I designed a drug policy scale which
I utilized to score each country’s addiction policy from punitive to rehabilitation centered. The
results from the OLS performed reveal a significant relationship between majoritarian
democracies and lower drug policy scores. This data was applied to two case studies: Portugal
(consensus) and the United States (majoritarian). The case studies revealed that consensus
characteristics may have played a role in the effective implementation of rehabilitative policies
in Portugal, while majoritarian characteristics may be a factor in the lack of change in US drug
policy, supporting the idea discovered in the statistical analysis.
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I.

Introduction
Drug use is a global problem. Addiction quite literally reaches every corner of the world

and, unfortunately, most negatively impacts vulnerable and marginalized groups. According to
the 2021 United Nations World Drug Report, around 275 million people used drugs worldwide
in 2020, and 36 million struggled with drug use disorders. Alarmingly, this same report predicts
that drug use is projected to rise by 11 per cent by 2030, and low-income countries will account
for the majority of the rise (26). The rising rate of use fuels the growing illicit drug trade, which
prevents economic and social development and acts as a considerable threat to security and
stability in many parts of the world.
Though substance use is a global issue, there is not a single, standard response to this
problem that is shared internationally. The methods countries use to tackle this pressing issue
vary greatly, and generally range from punitive, also known as criminalization, responses to
more rehabilitation-centered approaches, or some combination of the two. Growing up in a rural
Kentucky community where addiction was widespread and stood in the way of community
growth and economic opportunity, I noticed early-on that my county responded with strict,
punitive action. As I learned more about harm reduction methods and rehabilitation in other
countries, I became deeply fascinated with this variation in policy response. Through this project,
I hope to better understand what factors lead to this discrepancy; specifically, I aim to explore if
the underlying difference is linked to the different governing institutions in place. To examine
the relationship between government systems and addiction policy, I focus on 39 countries
considered industrialized democracies by Freedom House and evaluate their unique responses to
substance use.
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In its pursuit to better understand the impact government institutions can pose on the kind
of addiction policy adopted in industrialized democracies, this research will contribute to the
greater conversation surrounding the barriers that stand in the way of the implementation of harm
reduction and rehabilitative measures in some countries. The bulk of existing research regarding
the impact of government institutions on this sort of social and health policy does not focus on
addiction. Instead, it centers around subjects such as the impact of government structure on crime
policies (Karstedt & LaFree, 2006; Lin, 2007), or the effects of government and economic
systems on the prevalence of a country’s welfare state (Hicks & Kenworthy, 2003; Scruggs &
Alan, 2008). Another more widely researched topic is the differences in the implementation of
the death penalty as they relate to variances in democracy (Burt, 1994; Anckar, 2004).
Throughout this study, I lean heavily on the findings of Dr. Arend Lijphart in his book
Patterns of Democracy (2012). Dr. Lijphart’s discussion of consensus and majoritarian
democracies, which I will discuss further in “Overview of Democracy Categories,” informs the
framework of my research. Moreover, Dr. Lijphart directly analyzes the relationship between
this democracy type and the aforementioned categories of the welfare state and the death penalty
in his chapter “The Quality of Democracy and a ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Democracy.” He also offers
insight on the subject of incarceration as he compares these two types of democracies. However,
he does not evaluate addiction policy.
Some comparative scholarship exists with reference to addiction policy, but research on
this subject is sparse and does not exclusively pertain to democracy (Mehrolhassani et al., 2019).
More research generally evaluates policy barriers that stand in the way of the implementation of
harm reduction in countries like China and Vietnam (Hammet et al., 2008), Switzerland
(Uchtenhagen, 2010), or in a handful of European states (Kender-Jeziorska, 2019). Regardless,
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none of these studies draw connections between these barriers and the type of government
institutions in place. A new data set was published recently, however, that served as a basis for
my research of addiction policy: the Global Drug Policy Index (GDPI). Published in 2021 by the
International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), this index is a unique tool that documents,
measures, and compares national-level drug policies in 30 countries, grants each country a score,
and assesses how they align with United Nations principles of human rights, health, and
development. Still, the GDPI does not compare variances in government institutions.
My thesis uniquely compares forms of democracy and addiction policies by evaluating 39
industrialized democracies in two ways: first, by granting each country’s policy a score on a
scale, which I designed, that ranges from strictly punitive to rehabilitation-centered, and then
assessing their form of democracy as either majoritarian or consensus. By comparing these two
factors, I hope to identify if government institutions impact a country’s approach to responding
to drug use. I have chosen to focus on these categories because I have identified it as an
unexplored area of addiction policy research, which aligns with Lijphart’s previous analysis of
the generosity of social policy in relation to democratic institutions. Though this study draws on
existing theory, it is distinct as it combines established framework on the subject of democratic
systems with a new evaluative scale for addiction policy to contribute to the pertinent
conversation of factors that impact a country’s response to substance use. It is my hope that this
study will introduce a new perspective to this pressing, global issue.
The next section will elaborate on my hypothesis and the information which prompted
my prediction. After this, I will take some time to explain my methodology and the scale which I
designed to evaluate addiction policy. I will then perform an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression on the collected data. Following this analysis, I will undertake qualitative case study
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research in regard to two countries: Portugal and the United States. Then, I will review the
results of this research. Finally, I will expand on my findings and reflect on how it contributes to
our understanding of factors that impact addiction policy implementation.

II.

Hypothesis

Borrowing from President George H.W. Bush’s acceptance speech, Dr. Arend Lijphart coins
consensus democracy as the “kinder, gentler” type of democracy. He further elaborates that these
kinder qualities are demonstrated in several ways. Firstly, consensus democracies are more likely
to be welfare states, meaning the government or well-established social institutions play a key
role in the economic and social well-being of its citizens, often through social expenditure.
Moreover, consensus democracies put fewer people in prison and are less likely to implement the
death penalty. Not to mention, they often prove better at protecting the environment and are
more generous with foreign aid. This conclusion is supported by Lijphart’s overarching finding
that consensus democracies are better at representing the people they serve; specifically, they
more accurately and inclusively represent minority groups and minority interests. One reason
this holds true is that consensus democracies employ proportional representation, ensuring all
parties and interests are represented in legislative bodies proportionately to the votes they
receive. (Lijphart, 2018).
With Lijphart’s findings in mind, my hypothesis is as follows: consensus democracies
respond to substance use with rehabilitative policy and harm reduction, as they are more willing
to financially support the resources necessary to implement them and are generally less likely to
implement harsh punitive sentences than are majoritarian democracies.

8

III.

Methods

To begin evaluating the impact of political institutions on addiction policies, I first identified
the dependent and independent variables that would pertain to this question. I adopted Dr.
Lijphart’s framework for the independent variable and identified each of the 39 countries in my
data set (which was selected from the Freedom House list of industrialized democracies) as
either consensus or majoritarian1. Conveniently, many of the countries in this sample overlapped
with the 36 countries Dr. Lijphart utilized for his study; when this overlap occurred, I utilized his
determination of the type of democracy. For those countries that were not included in Dr.
Lijphart’s sample, I employed his determinants of these two types of democracy and assigned
each country accordingly. Some major indicators of the majoritarian model, often referred to as
the Westminster model, include the concentration of executive power in one-party and baremajority cabinets, cabinet dominance, two-party systems, centralized government,
disproportional electoral systems, and constitutional flexibility. On the other hand, the consensus
model can be identified by executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets, executivelegislative balance of power, multiparty systems, proportional representation, decentralized
government, and constitutional rigidity (Lijphart, 2021).
Considering my aim is to evaluate the relationship between democracy model and addiction
policy types, the latter serves as the dependent variable. As mentioned in the introduction, there
is not one central source that identifies the nature of government responses to drug use as
rehabilitative or punitive. The only source that attempts this feat is the IDPC’s Global Drug
Policy Index. However, this report only evaluates the policies of 30 countries, which do not share

1

The complete list of countries labeled as majoritarian or consensus can be found in Appendix A.
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a common government structure. Thus, it was necessary to design a new scale from which to
assign each of the 39 industrialized democracies in the sample set a score. As such, I utilized the
IDPC’s framework of five indicators, their five indicators as follows: absence of extreme
sentencing and responses, health and harm reduction, proportionality of criminal justice
response, access to controlled medicines, and development (IDPC, 2021, p. 18). Though some of
these categories were applicable to a more specific set of only industrialized democracies, I
replaced those less applicable to democracies with other indicators, explained in-depth in the
following section.
i.

Explanation of Scale Categories and Rankings

To begin assessing the addiction policy responses of each country, I first designed a scale
using five categories: harm reduction measures, access to controlled medicines, criminal justice
and sentencing measures, response to personal cannabis possession, and response to personal
possession of other illicit drugs. In each category, I identified four indicators, ranging from
strictly punitive responses (given a 1 on the scale) to fully harm-reduction centered (given a 4).
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Table 1: Scale designed for determining nature of drug policies, 1 indicating punitive responses and 4 indicating fully harm-reduction centered.

As I individually evaluated each country’s policies, I graded their performance in each category
using these indicators. As such, each country received a total score between 4 and 20, with 4 an
indication of complete absence of harm-reduction practices and implementation of only punitive
policies, and 20 representing a completely rehabilitative approach. It is essential to understand
what policy qualities are assessed in each category and why they are important. As such, each
category must be discussed in-depth.
1. Harm Reduction Measures
Harm reduction, as opposed to the punitive approach, is built upon an understanding that
there has never been, and never can be a completely drug-free society. As such, harm reduction
seeks to minimize the harms associated with drug use while acknowledging the dignity of people
who use drugs (Drug Policy Alliance). This response to drug use can take multiple different
forms.
The first and most common form is needle and syringe programs (NSPs), also referred to as
needle exchange programs. These programs seek to reduce the spread of HIV, hepatitis, and
other infectious diseases by providing clean needles and syringes for people who use injectable
drugs. Most often, these programs operate in clinics, but some countries implement mobile vans
or delivery services to increase outreach. Moreover, NSPs often offer HIV and hepatitis testing,
supplies for cleaning drug paraphernalia, and condoms (Singer, 2018, p. 6).
Another way that harm reduction can take form in communities is through safe injection sites
(SIS), also referred to as drug consumption rooms. While NSPs aim to reduce the spread of
infectious disease, SIS’s seek to curb drug overdoses and provide a sterile space for individuals
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with drug use disorders to safely inject drugs (Bozza & Berger, 2020). SIS’s keep Naloxone,
commonly known as Narcan, a medication designed to rapidly reverse opioid overdose, on hand
as to immediately respond when participants begin to overdose (SAMHSA). SIS also reduces the
occurrence of public drug consumption while providing a space free of harassment and without
the risks of theft and physical and sexual assault (Singer, 2018, p. 6).
Other forms of harm reduction include access to Naloxone and drug-testing services. Often,
depending on the legal restrictions in place in each county, these services are provided in NSPs
or at SIS. However, they can also be offered at pharmacies and community health centers. A
2015 study found that providing Naloxone to even untrained bystanders greatly reduces overdose
deaths (Giolio et al., 2015). Regardless, in some countries, restrictions stand in the way of the.
availability of Naloxone, even for first responders (Singer, 2018, p. 10). While the availability of
Naloxone helps to prevent overdose after drug use, drug-testing services seek to reduce the risk
of overdoses by ensuring the drugs used are not laced with other substances. Fentanyl is a threat
to people who use drugs; heroin suppliers are increasingly lacing their supply with this
substance, which dually intensifies its effects and increases the risk of overdose (Whitehead,
2015). Furthermore, Carfentanil, a drug that is used to sedate elephants and is100 times deadlier
than fentanyl (which is 30 to 50 times more lethal than heroin itself), is also cut into heroin
supply by suppliers (Sanburn, 2016). Heroin, however, is not the only drug that can be laced with
other substances- any drug can be laced with stronger drugs. Considering music festivals are
often hotspots of substance use, some countries have introduced drug testing services for festival
attendees. One such operation in Canada identified that a substance sold as MDMA was actually
bath salts, and a tested supply of ketamine contained meth (Bain, 2020). Take home fentanyl
tests are another avenue for drug testing, which proved to alter drug-use behaviors when tests
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were positive in a 2019 study, as individuals in the study reported throwing away their laced
supply or using with other people present to reduce the risk of overdose (Goldman et al., 2019).
With this information in mind, I assessed the accessibility of harm reduction in each
country using the scale in Table 1 above. A score of 1 indicates that no harm reduction measures
are present within the sampled country. A score of 2 designates a country where one or two harm
reduction measures may exist, but they are not widespread. In some instances, harm reduction is
only present in major cities, although drug use still occurs in rural areas. If harm reductions were
concentrated only in select areas which were inaccessible for individuals with substance use
disorders in other regions, the country was tagged with a 2 in harm reduction. 3 designation
indicates a lack of variety in harm reduction measures, but that those measures that are
implemented are generally easily accessible across the country. Finally, a score of 4 indicates
that the country in question makes widely available several different forms of harm reduction.
2. Access to Controlled Medicines
Though controlled medicines are often identified as a form of harm reduction, they are also a
method of treatment, which is why they are measured in a separate category. The category of
controlled medicines encapsulates two forms of treatment: opioid substitution therapy (OST) and
heroin-assisted treatment (HAT). OST aids individuals with substance use disorders by reducing
heroin withdrawal and cravings while also eliminating the euphoric effects of the drug. There are
several different types of substitution opioids; the two most common medications are methadone
and buprenorphine. Methadone is a medication used commonly in the United States and many
other developed countries. It is administered orally and has a similar potency to heroin.
However, if injected, it has longer-lasting effects than heroin. Buprenorphine is also
administered orally. Both medications bind with opioid receptors and, in doing so, avert
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withdrawal symptoms while simultaneously not resulting in the euphoric experience caused by
drug use. The risk exists that individuals using these substitution medications will dissolve and
inject them, resulting in a high. In response to this concern, the medication Suboxone was
developed, which combines Buprenorphine with Naloxone. Because Naloxone is an opioid
antagonist, it blocks the patient’s opioid receptors if the medication is injected, thus preventing
the effects of Buprenorphine that result in a high (Singer, 2018, p. 4-5). Other, less common
forms of OST include orally administered slow-release morphine and extended-release
dihydrocodeine.
When patients remain enrolled in OST long-term, it has proven effective at reducing heroin
cravings and overall drug use. However, OST has a retention problem, considering it does not
provide a high for enrolled patients. HAT ensures safe drug use and does not have a retention
issue, as patients in HAT programs are still allowed to use the drug. In practice, HAT supplies
patients with controlled doses of heroin. This ensures that the dose is not unsafe and has not been
cut with other substances, a constant concern in regard to street heroin (Singer, 2018, p. 6). In
turn, these programs have proven to address other issues in countries such as Switzerland. No
overdose deaths have been reported in the country since the implementation of HAT and health
authorities indicate the treatment resulted in a decrease in new HIV and hepatitis cases and that
patients improved in their ability to function in social relations (Wooldridge, 2018).
The choice of controlled medicine used in OST is dependent upon its absorption rate, the
way in which it binds with opioid receptors, and the length of its effects. The medication best fit
for each patient varies case-by-case. Even then, some patients have trouble staying in the
program with the OST medication best for them. The existence of HAT acts as a solution to this
retention problem, ensuring that patients are at least using a drug supply free of laced elements.
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As such, it is critical that a country has multiple forms of medication-assisted treatment in order
to address the individual needs and journeys of each patient and increase the treatment’s
efficacy. Another group that benefits from access to controlled medicines is the prison
population. Intravenous drug use still occurs in prisons, and OST helps to prevent the spread of
HIV in prisons. Moreover, its result of reduced drug use also results in increased prison safety
and decreased post-release criminal activity and re-incarceration (Larney & Dolan, 2009, pp.
107). Regardless, several factors cause for barriers that prevent the implementation of these
treatment programs, and the extent and type of these blocks vary in each country. In many
countries, social stigma surrounding the use of controlled medications prevents their
implementation, as well as cultural barriers. Moreover, some countries are incredibly strict about
who can disperse the medication and often require special trainings for doctors. Another issue is
where patients can receive the medication. In some instances, controlled medicines can only be
used under supervision in special clinics. In others, medications may simply be picked up at a
pharmacy (Hall et al., 2021).
With all of these factors in mind, I designed the scale to measure access to controlled
medicines. A score of 1 indicates that no form of medication-assisted treatment is available in the
country. When granted a 2, a country only provides one form of controlled medicine, and
patients who wish to enroll face several barriers in their attempt to access the medication. A
score of three indicates that only one or two forms of medication are utilized in the country, but
there are some easily accessible avenues for patients to receive treatment. Finally, a score of 4
indicates that two or more forms of controlled medication are available and easily accessible
through several pathways, including in prisons.
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3. Criminal Justice and Sentencing Measures
The criminal justice and sentencing measures section of the scale is an assessment of
proportionality. By evaluating the proportion of rehabilitation opportunities for individuals
convicted of substance use to the extent of punitive response is necessary to evaluate the nature
of addiction policies in a country. Rehabilitative measures can take several forms and vary across
different countries.
One major indicator that a country depends on criminal sentencing to address substance use
is the presence of mandatory minimum sentencing. Mandatory minimums assign required
sentences to different drug convictions. In doing so, they deprive judges of the opportunity to
make decisions based on the circumstances of individual situations and, in some instances, result
in unnecessarily harsh sentences (Cassell & Luna, 2011). As such, mandatory minimums
indicate that a country requires incarceration as a response to drug-related convictions.
One alternative to incarceration that is implemented in some countries is drug treatment
courts (DTCs), also referred to as “drug courts.” These courts aim to supervise addiction
treatment in situations where the individual in the court would otherwise be incarcerated for a
drug offense. Moreover, the goal of DTCs is to ensure treatment for individuals who need it and
address drug use as the central cause of drug-related crime. Drug treatment courts do not have a
particular, defined structure and often vary in approach in different countries. However,
characteristics that are generally shared by programs include a structured treatment program
monitored by a court team consisting of a judge and prosecuting and defense attorneys.
Mandatory and frequent drug testing, often through urinalysis, is also a common feature of DTCs
(Csete & Tomasini-Joshi, 2015).
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Another indicator of rehabilitative measures is the presence of compulsory commitment to
care (CCC) in a country. CCC indicates a situation in which an individual who uses substances is
mandated by law to enter or remain in treatment. CCC, however, does not require any form of
medication treatment. Laws requiring compulsory commitment to care are relatively common
around the world. However, they vary in form and length. In some instances, the treatment
program is a mandatory alternative to incarceration. In others, it is offered as an alternative, but
enrollment in the program is voluntary. Moreover, the length of enrollment required by the law
varies by country (Israelsson & Gerdner, 2012).
The scale created accounts for these factors in order to assess the proportionality of the
criminal justice response in a country. A score of 1 reveals that all individuals who are convicted
of a small drug possession charge2 face incarceration and are not offered rehabilitative
alternatives. This score is often accompanied by mandatory minimum sentencing. A score of 2
indicates that incarceration is still a primary response to small drug possession charges and
mandatory minimum sentencing may exist, but there are a limited number of avenues through
which convicted individuals can seek rehabilitative alternatives. For example, DTCs often have
strict requirements concerning who can enroll in the program, but it is often the only available
alternative to incarceration. Moreover, a 3 indicates that the country still incarnates individuals
convicted of minor possession charges, but it offers many rehabilitative alternatives to willing
individuals. Finally, a 4 in this category reveals that a country takes a fully rehabilitative
approach and does not convict individuals who possess minor amounts of drugs. Though they

2

The language of drug charges varied greatly from country to country. In many places, drug use was not used as a
term in written laws, or it simply wasn’t considered illegal. Using small drug possession charges as the standard to
assess policies provided a more consistent and reliable comparison of drug policies in different countries.
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may implement CCC or charge individuals fines, imprisonment is not a part of their response
model to drug possession.
4. Response to Personal Cannabis Possession
Much can be observed about a country’s addiction policy with a glance over its cannabis
possession laws. The various forms of legal responses, whether it concerns the use of medical
cannabis or complete decriminalization or legalization, are often a highly contentious subject
when proposed. Recently, the relaxation of restrictions on cannabis has come to be considered a
form of harm reduction in and of itself because of its potential to reduce opioid use and overdose.
A 2014 John Hopkins study performed regarding the legalization of medical marijuana in the
U.S. found that rates of opioid overdose were, on average, 25 percent lower in states that have
medical marijuana laws than in those that did not. Moreover, a 2018 report that studied all
Medicaid fee-for-service patients in the U.S. from 2011-2016 discovered that there was a
decrease in opioid prescribing in states where legal medical marijuana was available. This
decrease was even more prevalent in countries with both legal medical and recreational
marijuana (Wen & Hockenberry, 2018). All in all, existing research suggests that the legalization
of cannabis may reduce opioid use, dependence, and overdose (Singer, 2018, p. 11).
With these factors considered the scale used to assess the cannabis laws of the 39
industrialized democracies was created. A 1 score on the scale is solely punitive, and all cannabis
use is considered illegal. A 2 indicates that marijuana for medical use is available and legal. A 3
reveals that the country has decriminalized all uses of cannabis, while a 4 indicates marijuana is
completely legal. It is essential to distinguish between decriminalization and legalization.
Decriminalization means that criminal charges are not applied to those drug and possession
charges that are decriminalized. In this sense, it is still illegal to possess and use drugs, though
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criminal penalties may be replaced with civil penalties such as education or treatment programs.
Criminal charges may also be replaced by a fine. Legalization, on the other hand, removes all
penalties for possession and use of a drug (Alcohol and Drug Foundation).
5. Response to Personal Possession of Other Illicit Drugs
Though the decriminalization of cannabis has become a more common phenomenon, the idea
of decriminalizing or legalizing other substances is often met with immense speculation. The
decriminalization of drugs eliminates criminal penalties for drug use and possession, possession
of equipment utilized for drug use, and minor drug sales. It is argued that the benefits of
decriminalization include saved money from the reduced prison population, increased efficacy of
law enforcement in other areas, the prioritization of health and safety over punishment, a
reduction in the stigma surrounding substance use, and the dismantling of barriers to harm
reduction measures. Portugal was the first country in the world to decriminalize drug use.
Though drug use has remained the same, the areas of arrests, incarceration, disease, and overdose
have all decreased (Drug Policy Alliance, 2017).
On the scale depicted above, the drug possession policy of each country was evaluated. A
score of 1 indicated that all drugs (other than cannabis) are illegal, and convicted individuals face
criminal charges. A 2 demonstrates that some drugs have been decriminalized. This category is
necessary because some countries may deem some drug use as more criminal than other drugs.
For example, a trend toward the legalization of psilocybin has emerged, as it has proven to be
therapeutically beneficial (Hartman & Margolin, 2021). Finally, similarly to the cannabis
possession charge scale, complete decriminalization was scored a 3, and full legalization was
granted a 4.
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After creating the scale, data was collected through a variety of different sources. For
some elements, such as cannabis and other drug regulations, as well as criminal justice and
sentencing, assessments were drawn from government documents. Many countries were home to
harm reduction agencies that published yearly reports. These were utilized to evaluate the
availability and types of harm reduction and controlled medicine. One organization in particular,
the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, published individual reports for
30 European countries in 2020 that cover each of these categories, other than cannabis and other
drug-possession-specific laws. For a complete list of sources used specifically for the drug policy
evaluation, please see Appendix B.
ii.

Control Variables

Now that the foundation of the new scale designed for this study has been reviewed, it is
critical to address those control variables that were also evaluated alongside the type of
democracy3. Three central control variables were considered: Freedom House scores, per capita
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the percentage of the country’s economy in the shadow
economy.
Freedom House is a non-partisan organization that produces research and reports on a range
of thematic areas that concern democracy, political rights, and civil liberties. This study utilizes
Freedom House’s Global Freedom Scores. This indicator is Freedom House’s rating of people’s
access to political rights and civil liberties in 210 countries and territories (Freedom House).
Each country is granted a score from 1 to 100, with 1-34 meaning not free, 25- 71 indicating
partial freedom, and 72+ revealing the country is considered to be free. Once again operating
from Dr. Arend Lijphart’s framework, it is possible that countries deemed “freer” would be more

3

The exact scores for all these variables can be found in Appendix A, organized by country.
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“kind and gentle” (and thus consensus), as citizens can more easily participate in the
government. As such, it is essential to include this as a control variable. The scores of all 39
countries were evaluated alongside the independent variable of addiction policy scores.
Another control variable that was considered is the GDP per capita. GDP per capita is a
central indicator of economic performance and is often utilized as a measurement of living
standards and economic well-being. As such, using GDP per capita as a control variable
evaluates if trends toward punitive or rehabilitative policies are related to economic factors, as
opposed to the influence of government systems. The GDP per capita of each country was
gathered and analyzed with the independent variable, addiction policy score.
The next control variable considered is the proportion of each country’s economy in the
shadow market. By nature, the shadow economy is a difficult factor to measure. In 2018, the
International Monetary Fund published a working paper that assigns values to the size of the
shadow economy in each country using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC)
approach. MIMIC is a hybrid-model-based estimation procedure that considers the multitude of
causes and multiple effects of the shadow economy (Mendina & Schnieder, 2018). Considering
drug dealing is one facet of the shadow economy, utilizing this control variable will help to
clarify if countries adopt more punitive policies in response to more criminal market activity, as
well as other factors.
The final control variable taken into account was that of ethnic fractionalization. Ethnic
conflict is an essential determinant of the political economy of many nations. Previous studies
have demonstrated the ethnic fractionalization is linked to GDP growth. It is possible that ethnic
fractionalization may facilitate an “us vs. them” mentality in some countries and, therefore,
punitive drug policies could be used to punish certain ethnic groups. As such, this is a critical
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factor to consider. To do so, I gathered data on the 39 countries from a previous study conducted
by the Nation Bureau of Economic Research (Alensia et al., 2003).
After all of these scores were gathered and the addiction policy scores were calculated for
each country, the form of democracy was assigned a binary variable (majoritarian was assigned a
1, consensus was assigned a 0). An Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) was performed on
the gathered data using the software Stata. The resulting data was then analyzed.

IV.

Results

After assessing the drug policies of each of the 394 countries and inserting them in the table
found in Appendix A, the values were used to measure the relationship between drug policies
and different country characteristics (democracy form, Freedom House score, LOG per capita
GDP, and IMF Shadow Economy, as stated above).

4

The table of categorial distribution of each country’s drug policy score can be found in Appendix C
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Figure 1: This histogram depicts the distribution of drug policy scores

The histogram above depicts the general trend of addiction policy scores. As is evident,
there are two outliers, which are Japan and South Korea. Most scores are concentrated around
the score of 9 to 16. There is also a positive outlier with scores of 18. Two of those high scores
were attributed to consensus democracies (Portugal and Slovenia), while one was attributed to a
majoritarian country (Spain).
Table 2, columns 1-3 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression that
was performed using this data. The first values listed for each variable are the estimates of the
coefficients. The coefficient on majoritarian democracies in column 1 indicates that a 1-unit
change (moving from a consensus to a majoritarian style democracy) in majoritarian is
associated with a 2.8 point reduction in addiction policy scores, as measured in the addiction
policy scale. Moreover, this column also indicates that a 1-point positive change in Freedom
House scores is associated with a .085 point increase in addiction policy scores.
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Column 2 demonstrates that, though the negative association in regard to majoritarian
scores decreases (down to a 2.76-point decrease), this variable still remains significant when
log GDP per capita is introduced to the regression. The same cannot be said for Freedom
House scores; when the log GDP per capita variable was introduced, the Freedom House
score decreased to a .070-point increase in addiction scores per 1 point change in Freedom
House scores. This value was no longer significant at the 5% one-tailed test. Moreover, the
log GDP per capita variable was also insignificant.
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In the third column, the IMF shadow economy variable was added to the regression.5
Once again, though the negative association between majoritarian systems and addiction
policies decreases (now with a 2.51 point increase), the majoritarian value remains
significant. Freedom House scores, log GDP per capita, and the shadow market economy
value all remain statistically insignificant. Across model specifications, the coefficient
estimate for the majoritarian variable remains significant.
Finally, the fourth column demonstrates that, again, the majoritarian system remains
significant, even when ethnic fractionalization is taken into account. The variable of ethnic
fractionalization dually is not statistically significant and does not reverse the significance of
the majoritarian factor. Freedom House scores regain significance in the column, but this is
attributed to the fact that only three of the variables were considered in this run of the
regression.
This regression indicates a negative relationship between addiction policies and
majoritarian systems that remains significant when several control variables are introduced.
Because the majoritarian variable remains significant at the 1% one-tailed test throughout all
three tests, it is very likely majoritarian countries will have a lower drug policy score.
Moreover, this level of significance indicates that one could be very confident that this isn’t
the result of random error. In fact, the majoritarian variable is the only country characteristic
that remains statistically significant. Though Freedom House scores were significant in the
first regression, when additional variables were introduced, its significance did not persist,
suggesting that this is not simply related to a state having a relatively high-level or

5

The number of observations decreases in this sample by 1, as the IMF did not calculate a shadow market economy
value for Panama.
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consolidated democracy, but instead related to the distinction between majoritarian and
consensus democracies.
To balance these quantitative observations, I undertake a case study of each type of
democracy in the following section. Specifically, I evaluate if the association between
democracy type and addiction policy holds true in the country’s government in practice. I
delve into the government and addiction policies of the United States (majoritarian) and
Portugal (consensus).
V.

Consensus Case Study: Portugal

Portugal is widely known as a trailblazer in the harm reduction realm, which is reflected in
its drug policy score. Portugal scored an 18, the highest score received across all 39 countries
and shared only with Spain and Slovenia.6 Specifically, this European country was the first in the
world to decriminalize all drugs in 2001. Though Portugal is considered a consensus democracy
today, it has undergone a transition from authoritarian structure in the last 50 years. In order to
understand if consensus structure has impacted the addiction policies in Portugal, it is essential to
trace its transition and the history of its drug problem.
Following the Second World War, Portugal was one of two countries in Europe that
remained governed by authoritarian power, alongside Spain. Under the authoritarian dictatorship
of Antonio Salazar, who took power in 1932, Portugal was a rigidly Catholic, conservative, and
traditional society. Moreover, it was closed off to new ideas and trends, as well as changes
occurring in other Western societies. Drug use was limited in the country; even the
counterculture movement, which fashioned drug use as a component of culture, largely passed
over Portugal in the 1960’s. This is not to say drug use did not exist- it did- but it was mainly

6

All drug policy scores can be found in Appendix A.
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centered around LSD and maintained in Portugal’s small community of artists. This drug use
trend, however, had little social impact (Domosławski, 2011).
In the 1970’s, drug use became a major problem in Portugal. There are several factors that could
have contributed to this increase in substance use. One of these potential influences is the return
of Portuguese citizens, largely soldiers, from the country’s colonies, where marijuana was grown
and widely used. A second factor is the fall of Salazar’s dictatorship in 1974, following the
Carnation Revolution, which rapidly exposed the once tightly closed Portugal to the world. This
legacy of isolation left Portugal unprepared to confront those challenges that accompany an
increase in drug use within a country: there was no common knowledge about the impact of
drugs, both in the physical and social issues they cause, and no distinction between hard and soft
drugs existed. Though marijuana was the most used drug in the country in the 1980’s, heroin
began to appear in Portuguese markets in the 1970’s. Heroin was being smuggled in from a
variety of sources, making it impossible for authorities to prevent the trade (Domosławski,
2011).
While the new issue of drug addiction was growing in the country, Portugal was
undergoing a democratic transition. Portugal’s first provisional governments were marked by an
“anti-authoritarian” coalition, as well as a desire of the new authorities to replace and punish
some members of the previous elite and dissolve existing authoritarian institutions. By February,
official reports indicated that approximately 12,000 people had either been removed from their
positions or suspended. Unlike the ruptura pactada (negotiated rupture) that occurred in Spain,
Portugal’s transition was not facilitated through negotiations with the dictatorial elites. The
country’s transition quickly eliminated the regime’s political institutions. With the consolidation
of democracy within the country, some parties on the right attempted to criminalize those radical
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elites during the transition in 1975. However, an agreement to denounce authoritarianism and the
‘excesses’ of 1975 ended attempts toward retroactive justice and led to the reintegration of many
of those who were condemned during the process (Pinto, 2008). What eventually resulted from
this transition is a stable parliamentary democracy and a multiparty political system, which is
accompanied by regular transfers of power between parties (Freedom House, 2020).
By the late 1980’s, drug use had become a central social concern in Portugal. In 1997, a
EuroBarometer survey highlighted that Portuguese people identified drug-related issues as the
country’s central social problem. Interestingly, the first study of drug use in Portugal in 2001
demonstrated that the drug consumption rate in Portugal was one of the lowest in Europe.
However, it was among the highest for problematic drug use, especially heroin use (Beyrer et al.,
2010). Much of the concern surrounding substance use was believed to stem from the increase in
visible drug use in the public sphere. The public use of drugs conflicted with the morally rigid
history of the country, which points to another reason why substance use may have been cause
for major concern (Domosławski, 2011).
The initial government response to the growing drug problem in Portugal in the 1980’s
was the creation of TAIPAS treatment center in Lisbon. Private drug treatment centers were also
established around this time. However, drug use continued to rise across all types of drugs, and
heroin use in the HIV-positive population became a growing concern. Overarching fear of police
and criminalization prevented individuals from seeking treatment and establishing syringe and
needle exchange programs remained illegal. In fact, the legal system still regarded the use of
drugs to be at a similar crime level as drug dealing (Domosławski, 2011). However, in 1998,
atypical and monumental drug policy reform occurred in Portugal, contrasting the country’s
authoritarian and traditional background.
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The 1998 reform consisted of a government-appointed committee of specialists, the Commission
for the National Strategy to Fight Against Drugs, who were asked to evaluate the existing drug
policies in the country and create recommendations for a new, national strategy. In eight months,
the committee presented its findings in a report that included comprehensive recommendations
for 12 different areas of drug policy. The report also suggested that the complete
decriminalization of hard and soft drugs, coupled with focus on developing harm reduction
networks, was the best course of action for addressing addiction in Portugal. In the same year,
the Commission delivered its report to the Portuguese Parliament. The Parliamentary Committee
on Drugs unanimously approved the report. One year later, it was approved by the Council of
Ministers and became the 1999 National Strategy for the Fight Against Drugs. This policy
outlined a set of strategies to guide action in regard to the drug problem, including international
cooperation, decriminalization, harm reduction in prisons, and developing treatment as prison
alternatives (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2020). These goals
resulted in the creation of the Dissuasion Commissions, which replaced criminal courts as the
mechanism of the state for responding to drug use (Clay, 2018). It is essential to note that this
new commission was placed under the Ministry of Health, as opposed to the Ministry of Justice,
a reflection of Portugal’s acknowledgement of substance use as a disease instead of a legal
matter.
Portugal’s adoption of this drug policy is reflective of consensus characteristics in several
ways. Firstly, consensus democracy is marked by concertation meetings between governments
and interest groups, indicative of the collective-responsibility form of this type of government
(Lijphart 246). The Portuguese government’s willingness and initiative to allow a group of
experts to oversee such a massive policy change is one indication that consensus structure may
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be linked to Portugal’s shift toward rehabilitative policy approaches, while many countries
respond to a rapidly growing drug problem with emergency or zero-tolerance policies.
Another factor to consider is that this policy was fostered through a coalition. According
to Lijphart, the consensus model contrasts the majoritarian tendency to concentrate power in oneparty cabinets. Instead, consensus democracies lean toward all or most important parties sharing
executive power in a broad coalition (2012, p. 661). Portugal employs a proportional
representation electoral structure and multi-party system. This structure, common in consensus
democracies, allows smaller interest groups to be represented in governing bodies via the
proportional representation election mechanism. In 1998, when these sweeping drug policies
were proposed, the Socialist Party (PS) occupied a simple majority in the Portuguese Assembly,
falling only 4 votes short of an absolute majority in the 1995 elections. There was considerable
opposition from the right-wing leaders in the country, who feared that decriminalization would
result in Portugal becoming a hot spot for drug tourism (Domosławski, 2011). However, because
the Social Party formed a coalition with smaller parties on the left, it was possible to overcome
opposition. This consensus characteristic seems to have played a role in the successful passage of
Portugal’s drug policy legislature.
Lijphart’s concept of the “kinder, gentler” democracy applies to this policy decision in
Portugal. In their research, Domosławski details the results of an interview with a member of the
Institute on Drugs and Addiction (IDT) in Portugal. The interviewee reported that, after living
under a dictatorship for years, the Portuguese public was sensitive to the needs of society’s
weaker members. This highlights why the government felt confident in this drastic change in
approach: they believed the public would agree that it is better to treat addiction as a disease
rather than a criminal penalty (2011, p. 24). As asserted by Dr. Lijphart, consensus democracy is
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better at representing minority groups and minority interests, and doing so more accurately and
inclusively (2012, p. 3621). The active effort on the part of the government to address drug use, a
problem that directly impacts a small proportion of the population, aligns with the consensus
quality of representing minority interests inclusively. The goal of eliminating punitive penalties
for drug use and possession is also reflective of Lijphart’s findings concerning criminal justice,
as he found that consensus democracies put 60 fewer people per hundred thousand in prison than
majoritarian democracies (2012, p. 3843). Portugal’s aim of reducing drug-related incarceration
through decriminalization is another factor that highlights consensus characteristics.
One factor of Portugal’s government that is not typically found in consensus democracies
is the semi-presidential system. However, the President in Portugal does not enjoy wide
executive power over domestic affairs. Instead, as according to the European Union, he serves as
the head of state and deals more closely with international relations and foreign policy issues,
while the Prime Minister serves as the head of government. As such, the majoritarian
characteristic of the concentration of executive power is not as applicable to the Portuguese
model, where domestic affairs are dealt with primarily by the legislature. All in all, the
implementation of the Portuguese drug policy seems to be connected to the consensus structure
of the government in which it was passed, as the creation of commissions took the policy from
the hands of politicians and gave it to technocrats, minority parties were able to ban together to
acquire the power to pass the law, and minority interests were addressed in an inclusive, “gentle”
manner.
VI.

Majoritarian Case Study: The United States

The U.S. drug policy starkly contrasts that of Portugal. While Portugal is renowned as a
trailblazer in harm reduction and addiction policy, the U.S. is known for something quite
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different: the highest incarceration rates in the world (World Prison Brief, 2018). Moreover, 1 in
5 incarcerated people in the U.S. were arrested for a drug offense (Sawyer & Wagner, 2020).
This focus on punitive responses to drugs is closely linked with the U.S.’s “war on drugs,”
declared by President Nixon in June of 1971. This initiative was coupled with an increase in
federal drug control agencies and other harsh punitive measures such as mandatory sentencing
and no-knock warrants. Nixon created a commission to review drug policies, however, when
Nixon temporarily placed marijuana under Schedule I, the most restrictive drug category, he
chose to ignore the commission’s unanimous recommendation to decriminalize personal
possession of the drug (Gerber, 2004).
The 1980’s and 90’s in the U.S. were marked by a sort of drug hysteria. When Ronald
Reagan became president in 1981, his wife Nancy Reagan coined the catchphrase of their drug
policy approach: “Just Say No.” The Reagan drug policy was accompanied by the
implementation of zero-tolerance policies, which were introduced in the mid-1980’s. The
political hysteria surrounding drugs began in the late 1980’s and was met by the implementation
of draconian policies which led to rapid growth of the prison population. The percentage of
Americans reporting drug abuse as the most important problem in the U.S. jumped from 3
percent in 1986 to 64 percent in 1989 (Berke, 1989). However, the actual, reported incidence of
drug use declined while public concern surrounding the issue increased during the 1980’s
(Beckett, 1994). This concern dropped to ten percent within one year, likely linked to a reduction
in media interest, but the harsh policies created during the frenzy of the 80’s remained in place
(Drug Policy Alliance, 2020).
The excessive responses of the 1980’s and 90’s have not been addressed and drug policy
change in the U.S., if any, has been slow to start. Bill Clinton promoted a treatment approach
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overcriminalization in his 1992 presidential campaign. Once elected, he quickly reverted to drug
war strategies. Though the war on drugs was losing momentum when he became President,
George W. Bush allocated the largest ever budget for the cause and further militarized drug law
enforcement. President Obama supported several successful policy changes, including closing
the gap between crack and powder cocaine sentencing and ending the federal funding ban for
syringe exchange programs. However, he did not shift the needle of drug policy funding toward
a treatment-centered approach (Drug Policy Alliance, 2020).
It is critical to analyze those majoritarian characteristics that may be linked with this
unwavering, harsh response to drug use in the United States. One could look at the origins of the
draconian U.S. drug policy approach when Nixon ignored his commission’s suggestion to
decriminalize marijuana. This action is an indication of interest group pluralism, given that
pluralism is marked by a multiplicity of interest groups. This establishes a sort of governmentversus-opposition competitive attitude and contrasts interest group corporatism, which is marked
by regular meetings of the government and interest groups (Lijphart, 2012). When the report of
his commission did not match his War on Drugs objectives, he was able to ignore the
recommendation, as pluralism would allow him to appeal to different groups that did support his
approach, while majoritarian standards do not set expectations for meetings between the
government and interest groups, leaving little responsibility for Nixon to address the
recommendations of his commission.
Another majoritarian factor that may impact U.S. drug policy is the government structure.
The United States legislature is elected through single-member districts, a characteristic of
majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems. Moreover, another factor of majoritarian
structure is the two-party system, which dominates the U.S. (Lijphart, 2012). The two major
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parties in the U.S. are the Democratic and Republican parties. However, these two structural
components render it nearly impossible for minority parties to take part in the legislature. Both of
the two most prominent minority parties in the U.S., the Libertarian and Green parties, highlight
decriminalization as a central issue. The Libertarian Party describes the War on Drugs as
“ineffective, unfair, and immoral,” (Libertarian Party, 2016), and the Green Party identified the
legalization of marijuana, decriminalization of all drugs, and expanded treatment as central
tenants of its platform in 2020 (Green Party). Even though both of these parties prioritize drug
policy reform, because they are minority parties, they cannot obtain power in the House of
Representatives and Senate, which is a result of the majoritarian structure of the U.S.
government. This factor is coupled with the fact that because drugs and crime are no longer a top
priority like they were during the drug hysteria, drug policy is no longer treated as a majority
problem. As stated above, public concern surrounding drug use dropped at the end of the 1980’s
alongside reduced media coverage. Though harmful punitive policies remain, there is not enough
momentum for either party to adopt drug policy reform as a major policy platform, and there is
not enough room in the two-party system for minority parties to step in and prioritize the issue.
VII.

Discussion and Conclusion

In summary, quantitative, OLS analysis of addiction policies in industrialized democracies
reveals that there is a significant relationship between majoritarian democracy structure and
lower drug policy scores, indicating a potential relationship between majoritarian democracy and
punitive policy approach, as well as a potential connection between consensus democracy and
rehabilitative policy responses. Working from this macro, quantitative perspective and then
focusing on qualitative case studies allowed a closer look into how this relationship plays out in
practice. It is clear that there are several connections between Portugal’s successful
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implementation of rehabilitation-centered drug policies and its consensus structure, as well the
U.S.’s unchanging punitive policy and its majoritarian government system. Though the evidence
from these case studies is limited, what was discovered reveals that the significance of the
relationship between democracy type and drug policy type discovered through quantitative
research is borne out in qualitative, case-study examples, suggesting the trend I have identified
through my analysis has persisted in modern drug policy reform efforts, or the lack thereof.
Limitations of Study and Potential for Future Research:
I am hopeful that this research makes a meaningful contribution to the conversation
surrounding drug policies and the impact of democracy types. However, it is critical to recognize
those limitations to my research which may inform future research. Firstly, while I am incredibly
proud of my self-designed policy scale, I acknowledge that a larger team and more experience
could lead to a more sophisticated scale. For example, the GDPI utilizes 75 policy indicators and
expert consultations to score each country’s drug policy. Even then, the individuals behind the
report acknowledge that they were unable to measure all of the aspects of drug policy that they
had hoped to in their limitations. I do not have access to the resources necessary for such a
sophisticated analysis, and I, admittedly, was also unable to measure all of the aspects of drug
policy that I hoped I could.
It is also essential to note that placing a numerical value on such a complex issue as drug
policies is certain not to capture the entirety of a country’s policy or the nuances of the unique
situation of each country. Moreover, this methodology, especially in the process of defining
policy scale indicators, results in some trade-offs and limitations in the information that can be
included in the study. However, I remain optimistic that this study is worth the undertaking in its
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result of making room for both comparative and country-level insights about the state of drug
policies in industrialized democracies.
After completing this project and beginning a case study process, individual cases studies
of each country’s drug policy through the lens of democracy type would certainly be a
contribution of interest. It would be of great benefit to understand how majoritarian or consensus
structure impacts the implementation of drug policies in several different countries as to further
explore this potential relationship. A more rigorous case study effort would certainly strengthen
the understanding of this issue.
It would certainly be beneficial for a larger team to take on this framework and further
sophisticate the drug policy scale and levels of analysis used in this methodology. It would be
especially beneficial to consult with experts from each country and from major organizations that
consider drug policy data. I would like to think that this study is a great first step toward
understanding the complex relationship between drug policies and democracy structure, but I
understand it could only be improved with a more complex analysis that utilizes expert
understanding.
As the movement toward harm reduction approaches has started to gain traction
internationally, researchers must continue to identify issues that prevent the implementation of
harm reduction measures in some countries. Punitive policies often reduce access to treatment
and perpetuate cycles of addiction. It is also critical that scholars who analyze the relationship
between democracy type and Dr. Lijphart’s proclaimed “kinder, gentler” qualities begin to
include drug policy as an indicator of the gentleness of any one democracy. I would also
recommend that drug policy non-profits and interest groups begin to consider democracy
structure as a factor that may impact the success of drug policy reform. If more energy is focused
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through the lens of this potential relationship, actors will hopefully find ways to overcome the
structural barriers that prevent the successful implementation of rehabilitative policies in some
countries.
As an individual who has lived in a community deeply impacted by addiction, I have
spent my whole life seeking to understand those factors that prevent access to treatment and put
countless individuals behind bars, resulting in an often life-long cycle of incarceration and a
community-wide problem. Now, I realize that this problem is not one caused exclusively by law
enforcement or individual policymakers: it is a structurally rooted issue. With this knowledge, I
feel more confident as I continue to dedicate my career to making harm reduction services more
widely accessible worldwide and reducing incarceration for drug-related crimes.
Given my personal experiences and longing for understanding, this study has granted me
some contentment in the discovery of this potential relationship, and it has certainly equipped me
with more expansive and comparative knowledge on the subject of international drug policy.
Though it would be unreasonable to suggest complete institutional reform is the best or most
efficient method of overcoming obstacles to drug policy reform and harm reduction
implementation, this study potentially reveals those institutional flaws in majoritarian systems
such as the U.S. which leave individuals with substance use disorders as unincluded,
unrepresented, and unheard minority groups, highlighting an avenue for change.
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